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Abstract
We used household survey data from the rural Ethiopia to investigate
the importance of governance for agricultural productivity. We argued
that the impact of governance is household specic and identied some
governance indicators accordingly. Trust in government and government
o¢ cials, strength of property rights and personal contact with local au-
thorities are identied as governance indicators. A stochastic frontier pro-
duction function is specied and estimated to capture the e¤ects of gov-
ernance on productivity or technical e¢ ciency of households. Our results
show that improvement in governance could reduce technical ine¢ ciencies
signicantly and hence could considerably boost productivity.
1 Introduction
The role of governance in explaining cross country economic performances has
received considerable attention. In their empirical study, Kaufmann, Kraay and
Zoido-Lobaton (1999) showed that there is a casual relationship from better
governance to better development outcomes. Khans (2006) review of the em-
pirical literature also supports the positive role of good governance for economic
performance.
One of the common features in the empirical literature is the overlap between
the studies on governance and institutions. Most of the governance indicators
are also used as an indicator of institutional qualities, though the two concepts
are not necessarily the same. Accordingly, the risk of expropriation by the
government, government e¤ectiveness, constraints on the government, politi-
cal stability and freedom from graft are some of the variables used to construct
institutional index. Using some variant of these indicators, many studies includ-
ing Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik et al (2004), Acemoglu et al (2001, 2002),
Contact address: daniel.zerfu@economics.gu.se
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Dollar and Kray (2003), Easterly and Levin (2003) examined the empirical link
between institutions and growth.
In the empirical literature, the endogeneity of institutions- whether better insti-
tutions cause growth or vice versa- is well recognized and di¤erent instruments
are proposed. Hall and Jones (1999) instrumented institutions by the extent
of Western European inuence measured by distance from the equator and the
extent to which the primary languages of Western Europe are spoken as rst
languages today. Acemoglu et al (2001) used mortality rate of colonial settlers to
instrument for institutions on the premise that mortality rate determines early
institutions which in turn explains current institutions. Rodrik et al (2004)
and Easterly and Levin (2003) also followed the same method to instrument for
institutions.
The empirical evidences from the above exercise showed that institutions are
important determinant of growth. Rodrik et al (2004) reported that integra-
tion, geography and trade have either no direct e¤ect or at best weak e¤ects
on incomes once institutions are controlled for implying that the measures of
property rights and rule of law trumps everything else. Acemoglu et al (2001)
also found that distance from the equator and the African dummy to be in-
signicant after controlling for institutions. Easterly and Levin (2003) reached
to a similar conclusion that institutions a¤ect growth signicantly. More or less
similar results have been reported in Dollar and Kray (2003), Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005) and Hall and Jones (1999).
Nevertheless, the empirical results are not without serious scrutiny. Glaeser
et al (2004) discussed the validity of the empirical results in detail. First, they
noted that the usual measures of the risk of expropriation and government e¤ec-
tiveness rise with the level of economic development. That is, the causality may
run from growth to these measures as opposed to the other way round. Second,
the measure of constraints on the executives is volatile especially in developing
countries implying that it cannot be considered to show durable institutions.
Moreover the perception based indicators may be inuenced by recent measures
of growth, political events, and herd e¤ects and hysteresis (Haque et al 1996,
Brewer and Rivoli, 1990, and Soverville and Ta­ er, 1995 respectively; all cited
in Aron, 2000). Third, Glaeser et al (2004) argued that the instrumental vari-
able estimation results, specically the work of Acemoglu et al (2001) and its
derivatives, are awed. They showed that the results of Acemoglu et al do not
establish a role for institutions as the European settlers may have brought
with them not so much their institutions, but themselves, that is, their human
capitalGlaeser et al (2004: 274).
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2006) also noted that the aggregate gov-
ernance indicators could be blunt tool for policy analysis at a country level as
specic aspects of governance may appear to be important in di¤erent countries.
After reviewing the empirical literature, Pande and Udry (2006: 2) concluded
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that this literature is essentially completeas the number of available instru-
ments are limited on top of their coarseness that prevents the analysis of how
institutions a¤ect growth. They call for micro-data analysis to push the lit-
erature further. We, accordingly, follow their suggestion to look into the link
between governance and agricultural productivity.
There are some studies that looked at how governance a¤ects productivity at
cross-country level (see Meon and Weill, 2005, Jayasuriya and Wodon, 2005,
and Lio and Liu, 2004 for instance). However, we are not aware of any study
dealing with how governance a¤ects productivity using a micro data at house-
hold level. This paper is, thus, an attempt to ll this gap. We argued that
even though households are under the same governance structure, the e¤ects
of governance can be household specic depending on the transaction cost each
households face. Some households may face high transaction costs due to bad
governance while others dont. For instance, good contact with the local bureau-
crats may cut transaction costs signicantly even when the overall governance is
bad suggesting that the e¤ect of governance can be household specic. We posit
that householdsproductivity may vary depending on the quality of governance
structure they are faced with.
Following Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) classication of gover-
nance indicators, we develop the rule of law and e¤ectiveness of government
indicators at household level. Trust on government, security of property rights,
and personal contact with local authorities are used as rule of law indicators
while householdsperception on the competence of civil servants is used as an
indicator for government e¤ectiveness.
The next section discusses the link between governance and productivity. It
shows that good governance contributes to higher agricultural productivity
through its e¤ect on securing property rights, facilitating labor and credit mar-
kets, and promoting government e¤ectiveness. A simple model of how good
governance enhances productivity through its e¤ect on the return to e¤ort is
also presented. To empirically address this issue, we used a stochastic frontier
production function in which we can jointly estimate the frontier production
function and determinants of ine¢ ciency. This is contained in section three
followed by the description of our data, governance indicators and empirical
results in section four. Summary of the results and conclusions are provided in
the nal section.
The major nding of our paper is governance matters for productivity. Im-
proving in governance can cut ine¢ ciency of farmerssignicantly. In general
our results suggest that improvement in governance would cut the average level
of farmersine¢ ciency within the range of 10% to 15%. With good governance,
output can be increased signicantly without requiring additional input. This
underscores the importance of good governance in the process of growth and
development.
3
2 Governance and Productivity
Following Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999: 1) we dene governance
as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.
This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored
and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to e¤ectively formulate and
implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. For
our purpose we considered only the rule of law and government e¤ectiveness
measures of governance due to data limitation.
Rule of law refers to the extent to which agents have condence in and abide
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006:4). Maintenance of rule of law protects
citizens against theft, government expropriation and repudiation of contracts
and secures property rights which in e¤ect cut transaction costs. This would
make markets more e¢ cient and promote productivity.
Maintenance of rule of law a¤ects agricultural productivity in many ways. By
productivity we are referring to technical (in)e¢ ciency of farmers. Technical
ine¢ ciency refers to the failure to achieve a maximum level of output for a
given technology and specic amount of inputs. For instance maintaining se-
cure property rights and minimizing the risk of expropriation alone could a¤ect
agricultural productivity at least in three ways. First, security of land rights
determines the expected return of investment in land. When land rights are
insecure, the expected return on the investment in land attenuates. With the
slack in investment in land, the productivity of the inputs may decline which
in e¤ect leads to a level of output that is below the maximum achievable level.
Thus, tenure insecure farmers would tend to produce below what their produc-
tion frontier allow them exhibiting technical ine¢ ciency. The level of technical
ine¢ ciency would increase with the degree of tenure insecurity as the fall in
investment would be higher with higher degree of insecurity.
Second, with secure property rights, householdsproperties can be used as collat-
eral to get access to credit. Access to credit facilitates the optimal use of inputs
by relaxing the constraints on investment and hence cut technical ine¢ ciency.
Finally, when land rights are insecure and contingent on the physical presence of
a farmer in the village, labor mobility would be restricted. As a result farmers
may be denied of o¤-farm income and savings that could have been invested in
farm activities. To the extent that investment a¤ects productivity, restriction
on labor mobility would shrink the overall productivity of households.
The other aspect of governance is government e¤ectiveness. It refers to the
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
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implementation, and the credibility of the governments commitment t such
policies (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006:4). Better government ef-
fectiveness would cut transaction costs by improving the provision of public
services. Government e¤ectiveness directly a¤ects transaction costs of agricul-
tural households as they depend on government for the provisions of public
goods, agricultural inputs and extension packages. Improvement in government
e¤ectiveness will cut transaction costs of acquiring inputs and hence promotes
agricultural productivity.
Overall, good governance cuts transaction costs, makes market more e¢ cient
and hence promotes agricultural productivity. Below, we layout a simple frame-
work to characterize the link between productivity and governance.
A Simple Model
Households produce output (y) with a given amount of labor (l), capital (k) and
technology (A). For a given level of labor and capital, output among households
varies depending on household specic characteristics (i) such as human capi-
tal, and e¤ort (ei). That is,
yijl;k;A =

ypi with probability i + ei
yLi with probability 1  (i + ei)

(1)
where ypi and y
L
i are frontier and below frontier levels of output of household i,
respectively.  is the reward for households level of e¤ort.
The expected level of output of household i is given as
E(yi) = (i + ei)(y
p
i   yLi ) + yLi (2)
We dene technical ine¢ ciency of a household as the deviation between the
potential and actual levels of output of the household-i.e. (ypi   yLi ):
(ypi   yLi ) =
E(yi)  yLi
(i + ei)
(3)
For E(yi) yLi > 0; technical ine¢ ciency is a declining function of i; ; and ei.
The returns to householdslevels of e¤ort ( ) and e¤ort itself (e) depend on the
governance structure. Good governance that secures property rights, maintains
rule of laws and promotes governments e¤ectiveness signals a higher reward to
e¤ort. Thus, with good governance, we expect that both e¤ort and the return
to e¤ort would increase which in e¤ect cut ine¢ ciency.
For our empirical analysis, we used stochastic output distance function to mea-
sure farmersproductive ine¢ ciency -i.e. how far farmers are from their frontier.
And we examined to what extent governance explain the observed technical in-
e¢ ciencies.
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3 Empirical Framework: Distance function ap-
proach
We used output distance function to model multi-output production technology.
The distance function is proposed by Shephard (1953, 1970) and used, among
others, by ODonnell and Coelli (2005) and Brummer, Glauben and Lu (2006) to
characterize multi-output production technology. The output distance function
represents the maximum vector of outputs,Y = (Y1:::Yj), that can be produced
for given vector of inputs,X = (X1:::Xj) , and technology. For the output
set,P (X) , the output distance function is dened as
D0 (X;Y ) = min f :  > 0; (X;Y=) 2 P (X)g (1)
where  is the scalar distance by which the output vector can be deated. The
output distance function is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogenous and
convex in Y , and decreasing in X. If Y is an element of the feasible production
set, P (X), D0 (X;Y )  1; and D0 (X;Y ) = 1 if Y is located on the production
frontier (ODonnell and Coelli, 2005).
A Cobb-Douglas output distance function dened overM inputs and J outputs
can be written as
lnD = 0 +
X
m
m lnXm +
X
j
j lnYj (2)
For the case of two output (j = 2) , M inputs, and imposing the linear homo-
geneity in outputs (
P
j j = 1 ), equation [2] can be rearranged as
  lnY2 = 0 +
X
m
m lnXm + 1 ln(
Y1i
Y2i
)  lnD (3)
This can be generalized for j number of outputs by dividing the distance measure
and the j   1 outputs by the j   th output variable. That is,
ln(D=Yj) = 0 +
X
m
m lnXm +
j 1X
j=1
j ln(Yj 1=Yj) (4)
Equation [4] can be written as
  lnYj = 0 +
X
m
m lnXm +
j 1X
j=1
j ln(Yj 1=Yj) + u (5)
where u =   lnD is a non-negative term that captures the ine¢ ciency e¤ect.
As the distance from the frontier can be either due to ine¢ ciency or noise,
we followed the stochastic frontier approach proposed by Aigner, Lovell and
Schmidt (1977) and introduced a symmetric error term, v, to capture the noise.
Accordingly, the stochastic frontier and the ine¢ ciency equations are given as
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  lnYj = 0 +
X
m
m lnXm +
j 1X
j=1
j ln(Yj 1=Yj) + u+ v (6)
and following Battesse and Coelli (1995) we assumed truncated normal distri-
bution for ui = jUij where Ui~N

; 2u

and the ine¢ ciency equation is given
as
i =
X
g
gZg (7)
where i = E(exp(ui="i)) and "i = vi+ui; Zg are the determinants of technical
ine¢ ciency that include indicators of governance and household characteristics,
g and are the marginal e¤ect of determinant Zg.
Technical e¢ ciency in production of household i is given by TEi = E [exp ( ui) ="i] :
Estimating [6] and [7] individually leads to biased results. As a result the max-
imum likelihood method is used to estimate the stochastic production frontier
and the ine¢ ciency e¤ects simultaneously.
In practice, one problem with the estimation of the output distance function is
in relation to how to handle multiple outputs. For instance, consider the case of
four crop output production. And farmers produce di¤erent crops with di¤erent
combination but all farmers may not produce all the four crops. Assume that
50%, 35%, 30% and 45% of farmers produce crop 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
Also 35%, 15% and 10% of the farmers produce crop 1 and 2, crop 2 and 3, and
crop 3 and 4, respectively. If we normalize the distance function with output of
crop 1, the distance function can be written as
  lnYj = 0+
X
m
m lnXm+1 ln(Y2=Y1)+2 ln(Y3=Y1)+3 ln(Y4=Y1)+u+v
(8)
We cannot estimate the distance function in [8] with our assumed production
structure as there is no observation that enable us to estimate [8] given that the
farmers produce either one or two output with di¤erent combination. However,
we can estimate [8] for the case of two outputs, say crop 1 and 2. In this case we
will lose 65% of our observation since only 35% of farmers produce crop 1 and
2. Due to this problem, we resort to the estimation of the frontier production
function with aggregated output. Accordingly our estimable frontier production
function is given as [9]
lnYi = 0 +
X
m
m lnXm + ui + vi (9)
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where Yi is household i0s total value of output divided by a Laspeyres price
index1 . The ine¢ ciency equation remain unchanged as given in [7] above.
4 Data, Governance Indicators and Empirical
Results
4.1 Data
The data come from the sixth round of the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey
conducted in 2004. The total sample contains 1372 households in 17 peasant
associations in 15 districts (Woreda). Following Croppenstedt and Muller (2000)
we only considered cereal producing farmers with ox-plow technology to focus
on a specic technology. This leaves us with 937 households to be considered in
our analysis. The descriptive statistics are provided in Tables 1 and 2.
The overall picture shows the scarcity of land (1.86 hectare per household), the
low level of households head education (2.5 years), the rain-fed nature of the
agricultural activities (with only 27% of households have irrigated land) and
scarcity of farm animal with an average holding of 1.1 oxen per household.
The governance indicators (described below) show that the mean levels of trust
on government, government o¢ cials and Kebele o¢ cials range from 4.31 to 4.68
with the scale of 1 to 7. Disaggregating the trust measurements into the di¤erent
categories, Table 2 shows that about a quarter of the households are skeptical
about the fact that the government maximizes social welfare in the form of
doing what is right for the people. The combined proportions of households
who do not trust and who neither trust nor distrust government and Kebele
(Local authority) o¢ cials are 42.3% and 47.3%, respectively. This implies that
about half of the households either do not trust or have quite low levels of trust
in the government and Kebele o¢ cials.
4.2 Governance indicators2
Rule of law
Trust on government, security of property rights, and personal contact with
local authorities are used as rule of law indicators.
Trust on government: Bates (2005:xix) argues that for institutions to strengthen
incentives, private agents must recognize and believe that it is in the interest
1The price index is obtained by taking a weighted average of the price faced by each
household; the weights are the respective proportions of the crops in total value of output (see
Croppenstedt and Muller, 2000).
2Our classication of the governance indicators into rule of laws and government e¤ective-
ness may not be sharp.
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of those with power to employ that power in ways that safeguard, rather than
despoil, the creation of wealth.Following Bates we used trust on government
as an indicator for the overall maintenance of rule of law. Trust on government
may also show predictability of governments future action. Positive outlook of
the governments future action may promote e¤ort and hence productivity.
Our survey asks households whether they believe that the government does what
is right for the people or not. We posit that individuals trust on government
depends on how best the governance structure serves them. Accordingly levels
of trust on government can be used as indices for the quality of governance-i.e.
the higher the levels of trust the better the quality of governance and vice versa.
Protection of Property rights: we used the perceived risk of expropriation
as an indicator for the strength of property rights. Our survey asks households
about their expected land holding status in ve years time. Some households
perceive that they will be facing a risk of expropriation in ve years time while
the others are uncertain or expect either there will be an increase or no change
in their land holding.
Contact with local o¢ cials: Gwartney and Lawson (2006:1) argued that
Without rule of law, the benets from trade will be limited to those derived
from personalized exchange, trade among family members and persons in the
local neighborhood or village who know each other or at least know about each
other. Here, trade is based on personal knowledge, and contract enforcement
is achieved through family ties and social pressures.In cases where the rule of
law is maintained, we expect personal contact with local o¢ cials or authorities
to have no or little impact. Otherwise, personal contacts will be important for
contact enforcement and access to public services.
In the case of Ethiopia, some anecdotal evidences suggest the importance of
personal contact with the local authorities (Kebele). For instance according to
Human Rights Watch (2005: 28-29) report . . . people who had good relations
with Kebele o¢ cials were allowed to carry massive amounts of fertilizer debt
from year to year while for others repayment obligations were strictly enforced.
The households are labeled to have a goodcontact with the local bureaucracy
if: i. the household heads parents are Kebele o¢ cials; ii. the household head
is a Kebele o¢ cial; iii. the household head has close associate in his Keble.
In terms of access to credit supplied by the public institutions such as coopera-
tives, local organizations and government sources, good relationship with Kebele
o¢ cials may lead to better access. The descriptive statistics in Table 3 reveal
that around 23.4% of Kebele o¢ cials secured loan from government sources in-
cluding Kebele while 15.4% of the rest of households access government credit.
On average, it appears that Kebele o¢ cials have better access to credit from
government. Similarly, the proportion of households with either of the parents
working as Kebele o¢ cial and obtained government loan is also higher by around
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5.5 percentages points as compared to the rest of the households. The overall
picture shows that access to credit is an increasing function of political power
and personal connection with government o¢ cials. The patter of fertilizer use is
also similar with this. Chemical fertilizer use is uniformly high among farmers
who have political power or personal connection with local o¢ cials.
Government E¤ectiveness
Following Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) measure of government ef-
fectiveness by the quality of the civil service, among other indicators, we used
householdsperception on the competence of civil servants as an indicator for
government e¤ectiveness. In rural Ethiopia, the government is the major sup-
plier of fertilizer, extension packages and credit. These goods and services are
distributed to the rural farmers through governments local bureaucracy. The
local bureaucracy is also in charge of land allocation, dispute settlement and
organization of voluntary labor contribution. Thus, the e¤ectiveness of civil
servants and local o¢ cials is an important element for the e¢ cient distribution
of government provided goods and services, land allocation and settlement of
disputes.
4.3 Empirical Results
Table 4 presents the results from the maximum likelihood estimation of the
stochastic production frontier [9] and [7]. Table 5 presents tests on whether
the stochastic production frontier model with ine¢ ciency component is a valid
specication or not. The tests reject the null hypothesis that the deviation
from the frontier are only due to random noise in support of the existence of
ine¢ ciency e¤ects.
The result shows that land, labor and land fertility are the important variables
in explaining output. Both the site and regional dummies are also signicant
suggesting di¤erent levels of frontier for each locality considered. The returns
to scale, considering only land and labor, range from 0.43 to 0.45 suggesting for
the decreasing returns to scale. This result is comparable with the ones reported
by Weir and Knight (2000) and Croppenstedt and Muller (2000) ranging from
0.56 to 0.67. The average level of e¢ ciency ranges from 55% to 57% depending
on the specication.
The stochastic production function is estimated by introducing the di¤erent
governance indicators discussed above in the ine¢ ciency equation. The gover-
nance indicators are introduced in the ine¢ ciency equation separately and in
combination with each other. The second column of Table 4, Model 1, shows
that trust on government matters in explaining ine¢ ciency. The coe¢ cient on
the trust on government is negative and signicant suggesting that households
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who trust the government are less ine¢ cient by around 10%. That is, by im-
proving the governance structure, mean e¢ ciency could increase from 56% to
around 62%.
Strength in property rights has also a similar impact on ine¢ ciency. The third
column of Table 4, Model 2, shows that households who perceive that their land
would be expropriated in ve years time exhibit a higher level of ine¢ ciency,
though its coe¢ cient is statistically insignicant. Being a member of local au-
thority and trust on the competence of government o¢ cials have similar e¤ects
with a magnitude of 15% and 13% reduction in e¢ ciency, respectively. The
result on the impact of being a member of local authority is consistent with the
ndings of Goldstein and Udry (2005) in the case of Ghana. They found that
farmers who lack local political power under-invest and hence produce lower
level of output due to the uncertainty of their land tenure status.
The result on the e¤ect of being a member of local authority (Kebele) may cast
some doubt if it is the case that highly productive households are elected into
the local authority. In this case the observed correlation cannot be attributed to
the quality of governance. To check for this e¤ect another variable-relationship
with Kebele o¢ cials- is introduced in Model 8. The result is similar to the
previous one though the coe¢ cient is lower.
We introduced the governance indicators in combination of each other from col-
umn 6 to 9 of Table 4. The coe¢ cients of trust in government and membership
of local authority remain signicant and negative. When trust in government
and trust in the competence of government o¢ cials are combined together as
in column 9, trust in government becomes insignicant and its e¤ect on inef-
ciency drops to around 2% as opposed to 10% when it is introduced alone.
The coe¢ cient on trust in the competence of government o¢ cials remains neg-
ative and signicant. This may be due to the high correlation between trust in
government and trust in government o¢ cials.
Capital market failures in the form of constraining the farmers to get the re-
quired farm capital, oxen, on time could increase the mean ine¢ ciency by around
29%. We found education to be a signicant variable in cutting ine¢ ciency. The
result shows that a one more year of schooling could cut ine¢ ciency by about
3%. Lack of access to credit is, however, found to be insignicant.
Our empirical result can be extended to illuminate on the dynamic e¤ects of
governance. Governance at time t 1 determines the economic outcomes at time
t 1 and ahead. Consider individual who is negatively a¤ected by the governance
structure at time t  1 and hence impoverished. At time t, the individual may
not have enough resources to invest in her land which will make her less e¢ cient.
That is, bad governance in the past may a¤ect outcomes at present and future
periods. We included poverty status indicators in our ine¢ ciency model to
capture this e¤ect though we recognize that bad governance in the past is not
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the only cause of poverty. In all of the specications, our results show that poor
households are less e¢ cient than the non-poor, their di¤erence in ine¢ ciency
being around 27%.
An interesting aspect of this result is that improvement in governance that pro-
motes productive e¢ ciency would benet the poor signicantly. We simulated a
20% increase in technical e¢ ciency to investigate its impact on poverty. Assum-
ing marginal propensity to consume out of income MPC = 0:8, a 20% increase
in technical e¢ ciency implies a 20% increase in output which is translated into
a 16% increase in consumption. This exercise shows that the head count food
poverty rate falls by 6 percentage points from 25% to 19%. This may show the
pro-poor nature of governance improvement.
5 Summary and Conclusion
We approached the issues of how governance a¤ects economic performance from
a microeconomic perspective. There is an extensive part of the literature that
deals with governance and economic performance using cross country evidences.
Though the conclusion that governance matters is not quite controversial, the
accuracy of the governance indices are scrutinized. Even after so many adjust-
ment and ne tuning of the indices, the discontent continued.
To address these issues partially, we used household survey data to examine
how governance a¤ect householdsproductivity measured by their technical ef-
ciency. Our main argument to handle this issue is that the e¤ect of governance
is household specic. That is, even though the households are under the same
governance structure, the e¤ects of governance can be household specic de-
pending on the transaction cost each households face. Some households may
face high transaction costs due to bad governance while others dont for various
reasons. For instance, good contact with the local bureaucrats (social network)
may cut transaction costs signicantly even when the overall governance is bad.
Following the cross country classication of governance indicators, we develop
the rule of law and e¤ectiveness of government indicators at household level.
Trust on government, strength of property rights, and personal contact with
local authorities are used as rule of law indicators while households percep-
tion on the competence of civil servants is used as an indicator for government
e¤ectiveness.
The main advantage of our approach is the identication of governance indica-
tors that a¤ect farmersproductivity directly. To the extent that our indicators
are correct, our approach would identify the governance indicators that are re-
ally important for householdse¢ ciency in production.
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Our empirical results show that governance matter for the productive e¢ ciency
of households. We found trust in government to be an important variable in
explaining householdsine¢ ciency. Those households with higher levels of trust
in government exhibited higher levels of technical e¢ ciency. We interpreted this
result in light of the use of trust in governmentvariable. We argued that indi-
viduals trust the government when they are faced with a governance structure
that reduces their transaction costs by maintaining rule of law. In this con-
text good governance that maintain rule of law and minimize transaction costs
would boost technical e¢ ciency of households. In addition, when households
believe that it is in the interest of the government to employ its power in ways
that maximize the welfare of the society, they will have an incentive to exert
more e¤ort on their economic activities which imply higher levels of productive
e¢ ciency.
Security of property rights is also found to increase productive e¢ ciency though
its impact is insignicant. Secure property rights stimulate investment in land
by increasing the expected return on investment. To the extent that investment
in land contribute for productivity, secure property rights will cut ine¢ ciency
by promoting investment. However, tenure insecure farmers may involve in
investments in land that have quick returns such as chemical fertilizer. In such
a case and given our cross sectional data, di¤erences in levels of e¢ ciency due
to insecurity may not be observed. The low level of signicance of our tenure
insecurity variable may be viewed in this way.
Without rule of law, economic exchange would be based on personal knowledge,
and contract enforcement is achieved through family ties and social networks.
When rule of law is maintained, the laws rather than personal relationships
would determine the economic outcomes. Accordingly, when the rule of law is
violated, contact with local authorities would be an important factor in facil-
itating production and exchange. Our results support this claim. Households
with good relationship with the local authorities are found to be more e¢ cient
than the rest of the households. This result can be interpreted in the sense
that violation of rule of law increases transaction costs but they can be reduced
through good contact with the local authorities. However, transaction costs can
be reduced through good contact with the local authorities. Hence, households
with good contact would face lower transaction costs which would make them
more e¢ cient than the rest of the society.
E¤ectiveness of government, measured by householdsperception on the quality
of the civil service, is also an important determinant of householdsproductivity.
In rural Ethiopia, the government is the major supplier of fertilizer, extension
packages and credit. These goods and services are distributed to the rural
farmers through governments local bureaucracy. The local bureaucracy is also
in charge of land allocation, dispute settlement and organization of voluntary
labor contribution. Our results show that e¤ectiveness of civil servants is an
important factor in enhancing householdsproductive e¢ ciency.
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In general our results suggest that improvement in governance would cut the
average level of farmersine¢ ciency within the range of 10% to 15%. With good
governance, output can be increased signicantly without requiring additional
input. This underscores the importance of good governance in the process of
growth and development.
In a nutshell, good governance that maintain rule of laws, secure property rights
and high e¤ectiveness of government have paramount importance in reducing
ine¢ ciency and poverty. Governance that enables individuals to operate fully
under the constraints of e¤ective laws that secure property rights and reduce
transaction costs is necessary to achieve higher levels of output.
The main policy implication of our result is that promoting good governance
should be taken as a major agenda to achieve higher levels of output and also
reduce poverty. Maintaining rule of laws that diminishes the importance of
contact with local authorities and also cuts transaction costs, and improving
the competence of civil servants should be put at the forefront of reforming the
governance structure. The synergic impacts of improving the competence of
civil servants for the maintenance of rule of laws should also be examined.
Notwithstanding the importance of good governance, its realization is not ap-
parent. The political economy of reforming governance structure follows a com-
plicated path as it involves numerous interest groups with conicting objectives.
There are some generic studies that looked into this issue (see Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2001 for instance). However, understanding the political economy
of reform in governance with reference to a specic country could be one fu-
ture area of research to enrich our knowledge on how good governance could be
achieved.
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Appendix 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 Variables Mean 
Standard  
Deviation Range 
Value of output 1006.5 988.8 104.4 - 10239  
Land size (in hectare) 1.86 1.50 0.125- 21 
Household size 4.83 2.30 1- 15 
Working age household members 2.86 1.47 1 -11 
Number of oxen owned 1.10 1.08 0 - 9 
Access to credit (dummy 1=yes; 0=no) 0.76 0.43 0 -1 
Household head education 1.33 2.49 0 - 14 
Age 50.3 15.05 18 — 99 
Sex of the household head  
(dummy 1= male; 0=female) 0.74 0.44 0 -1 
Irrigated land  
(dummy 1= yes; 0=no) 0.27 0.44 0 -1 
Land Fertility 1.65 0.75 1 - 3 
 
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS 
    
Trust on Government  4.68 1.58 1 - 7 
Trust on Government Officials 4.49 1.63 1 - 7 
Trust on Kebele Officials 4.31 1.67 1 - 7 
 
Kebele membership of the household head  
(dummy 1= yes; 0=no) 0.23 0.42 0 -1 
Trust on government at village level 4.7 0.43 3.7 - 5.3 
Trust on government officials at village level 4.5 0.44 3.5 - 5.2 
Trust in kebele officials at village level 4.3 0.41 3.3 - 5.0 
 
Perceived transfer rights  
(dummy 1= yes; 0=no) 0.76 0.43 0 -1 
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Table 2: Trust  
Percentage of Households: 
Trust on 
Government 
Trust on 
Government 
officials 
Trust on 
Kebele 
Officials 
Strongly disagree 2.9 4.7 5.5 
Disagree 14.4 15.6 18.2 
Slightly disagree 7.5 9.7 12.0 
Neither agree nor disagree 10.2 12.2 11.5 
Slightly agree 25.4 23.4 23.4 
Agree 34.7 30.4 26.0 
Strongly agree 5.0 3.9 3.4 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Source of Credit and Fertilizer Use  
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Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Stochastic Frontier Production Function
Production Frontier Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(Labor) 0.073 0.073 0.083 0.078 0.072 0.066 0.068 0.073
(0.06)* (0.06)* (0.03)** (0.05)** (0.06)* (0.09)* (0.08)* (0.06)*
Log (Land Area) 0.376 0.377 0.37 0.366 0.364 0.364 0.372 0.363
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Land Fertilitu 0.029 0.029 0.03 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.027
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Sex 0.089 0.09 0.091 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.088 0.072
-0.146 -0.147 -0.14 -0.247 -0.243 -0.241 -0.154 -0.246
Age -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.090)* -0.151 (0.056)* -0.239 -0.178 -0.215 -0.126 -0.181
Constant 7.401 7.395 7.383 7.419 7.421 7.415 7.41 7.403
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Inefficiency Model
Trust on Government -0.096 -0.102 -0.108 -0.099 -0.02
(0.044)** (0.031)** (0.023)** (0.037)** -0.751
Tenure Insecurity 0.064 0.066 0.062 0.066
-0.16 -0.143 -0.17 -0.146
Trust on Government 
-0.129 -0.129Officials
(0.005)*** (0.037)**
Kebele Membership of 
Household Head -0.146 -0.152 -0.157 -0.16
(0.011)** (0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Household's head 
-0.083relation with Kebele
(0.075)*
Access to Credit -0.017 -0.017 -0.022 -0.019 -0.018 -0.016 -0.02 -0.019
-0.741 -0.747 -0.677 -0.715 -0.731 -0.76 -0.704 -0.711
Capital market failure 0.293 0.297 0.293 0.292 0.286 0.282 0.29 0.284
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Poor household 0.266 0.27 0.265 0.27 0.267 0.269 0.264 0.264
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Education of Household 
head -0.029 -0.028 -0.027 -0.022 -0.024 -0.026 -0.028 -0.025
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.03)** (0.02)** (0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.02)**
Constant 1.32 1.214 1.318 1.307 1.372 1.327 1.321 1.34
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
-0.872 -0.879 -0.872 -0.882Log -0.859 -0.848 -0.859 -0.855
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
0.884*** 0.876*** 0.879*** 0.887*** 0.881*** 0.867*** 0.872*** 0.862***
Mean Efficiency 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.58
Observations 943 947 945 953 943 937 937 935
p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 Notes: Regional dummies are included in all the estimation. The inefficiency term is assumed to be distributed as truncated normal. 
2( )σ
γ
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Table 5: Testing for Inefficiency Effect 
 
Null Hypothesis 0 : 0uH σ =  
  Log (Likelihood) ( )2 1χ  value 2Pr ob χ>  
Model 1 -942.80 11.49 0.000*** 
Model 2 -948.88 12.29 0.000*** 
Model 3 -944.62 11.35 0.000*** 
Model 4 -957.99 11.56 0.000*** 
Model 5 -944.78 11.00 0.000*** 
Model 6 -937.53 11.21 0.000*** 
Model 7 -936.06 11.62 0.000*** 
Model 8 -935.76 11.00 0.000*** 
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